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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of capital structure using a dataset of
firms in Malaysia.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper carries out a panel data analysis of 8,270 observations from
827 listed non-financial firms on the Malaysia stock market over the period 2008–2017. To estimate the model
and analyse the data collected from the DataStream and World Bank databases, the authors use static panel
estimation techniques as well as two-step difference and system dynamic GMM estimator.
Findings – The results show that profitability, growth opportunity, tax-shield, liquidity and cash flow
volatility have a negative and significant impact on debt measures. However, the effects of collateral, non-debt
tax and earnings volatility on measures of debt are positive and significant. In addition, firm size, firm age,
inflation rate and interest rate are important determinants of the present value of debt. The results also show a
significant inverse U-shaped relationship between the firm’s age and its capital structure. In general, the results
support the proposition advocated by the pecking order and trade-off theories.
Practical implications – The results of this study necessitate formulation of various policy measures that
can counter the effects of debt on firms.
Originality/value –The present study is among the earliest to use both the book andmarket value measures
of capital structure. It also uses three proxies for each: total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt. It
incorporates earning volatility and cash flow volatility as new independent variables in the model. These
variables have not previously been used together with both book and market value measures of capital
structure. The study also examines the non-monotonic relationship between firm’s age and capital structure
using a quadratic regression method. It applies both static panel techniques and dynamic GMM estimation
techniques to analyse the data.
Keywords Capital structure, Trade-off and pecking order theories, Static and dynamic panel data,
Non-financial firms, Malaysia
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Non-financial companies constitute the main sector of the national economy providing
various goods and services to the market, for the purpose of making a profit. They are the
most important capital demand units. In a sense, it is their demand for capital that leads to the
development and growth of financial activities and the financial sector. The good financial
situation of non-financial companies is not only the basis of the normal operation of the entire
economic system, but also enhances the operating conditions of financial institutions and
reduces the possibility of financial risks. In the indicator system, the ability of a non-financial
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Capital structure is one of the main issues in corporate finance. It is an optimal
combination of long-term debt and equity and is also an important corporate policy, dealing
with a firm’s activities, with debts and equity (Brounen et al., 2006; Vo, 2017). Since the work
of Modigliani and Miller (1958), there has been a growing literature concerning capital
structure. To date, however, no theory has explained the choice of capital structure even
though it has been a major topic of financial economists for decades.
Several theories have been developed to examine the financial structure of the firm, for
example, the static trade-off and pecking order theories (Fama and French, 2002; Frank and
Goyal, 2003; Goyenko et al., 2009; Kayhan and Titman, 2007), agency costs (Jensen, 1986),
market timing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; De Bie and De Haan, 2007; Hovakimian, 2006;
Jenter, 2005) and stock returns (Welch, 2004). In theoretical frameworks, there are two
opposing theories regarding the choice of external financing: the trade-off and pecking order
theories. Trade-off theory shows the capital structure is controlled by balancing the
advantages and costs of debt (Bradley et al., 1984). According to pecking order theory, firms
must pursue an order of hierarchical financing (Myers andMajluf, 1984). In empirical studies,
earlier researchers observing the limitations of these theories to explain the use of debt used
macroeconomic variables to complement their models of financing choice (Booth et al., 2001;
Mazur, 2007; Frank and Goyal, 2009).
Over the last decade, capital structure studies have become increasingly well known for
comparing different countries (Acedo-Ramırez and Ruiz-Cabestre, 2014). Some studies
implicitly assume that the effects of firm-specific factors on firm leverage are the same in each
country (Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003). Recently, studies that cover the United States and
European countries argue that the environment of a country’s institutions and international
operations influences the behaviour of finance managers as well as their finance policies
(Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Brounen et al., 2006). De Jong et al. (2008) report that corporate
leverage should be appropriately analysed because they find that the determinants of capital
structure have significant direct and indirect results for 42 countries. They also find that
some attributes are not equal across countries. In addition, a study by De Angelo and Roll
(2015) found that capital structure stability is the action, not the rule. Other than that, the
study by Campbell and Rogers (2018) states that firms with a high volatile capital structure
tend to gain less profit and lead to stricter dividend policies compared to firms with a stable
capital structure. Empirically, prior research finds that a firm’s capital structure is influenced
not only by firm-specific but also by country-specific factors (Li and Islam, 2019).
This study aims to investigate whether the choice of capital structure by companies in
emerging markets (Malaysian companies that are listed on the Bursa Malaysia) can be
explained by factors that have been investigated in developed countries. We use a
comprehensive data set of firms listed on the Malaysia stock exchange covering the period
2008–2017.
Crnigoj and Mramor (2009) state that although previous work proves that some capital
structure differences can be explained by modern capital structure theory in mature market
economies, the forces behind capital structure decision in emerging markets are still an open
question for investigation. This difference might be explained by the similarities of the
institutional and cultural structure amongst developed countries (Wald, 1999), while the legal
and institutional structure is significantly different in emerging markets. Vo (2017) argues
that emerging markets are partially open economies where the financial markets and
institutional developments are still far behind those of developed countries. Since the
introduction of the comprehensive economic reform in themid-1980s, emergingmarkets have
been gradually transforming their economies from a command to a market-oriented
approach. This reform creates a more competitive business environment toward equal
opportunity for private, foreign-owned, state-owned and privatized firms in obtaining
funding in financial markets. Over the last two decades, the governments of emerging
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markets have prioritized promoting financial liberalization and facilitating constant
institutional reforms. These economic reforms have resulted in some recent developments
in the equity and bondmarket in emergingmarkets. The development of stock markets gives
firms more options for raising finance for their investments; however, most domestic firms
still rely on bank credit as a major or even the sole source of external funding. One possible
explanation for this fact is that the stock market in emerging economies is still in its infancy.
Vo (2017) also argues that the problems of information asymmetry, higher volatility and
higher transaction costs are evident in most of these stock markets. These problems clearly
hinder firms in accessing finance through the stock market.
Against this background, a study focusing on capital structure determinants in a
Malaysian sample is appropriate. Malaysia has certain characteristics (e.g. institutions and
cultural characteristics) that are comparable to other emerging and developed markets. In
addition to a developed equity market, there exists a well-developed and functioning bond
(debt) market inMalaysia (Matemilola et al., 2018). TheWorld Economic Forum (2015) in their
global competitiveness ranking, ranked Malaysia as number four out of 144 countries in
terms of financial market development. Likewise, theWorld Bank (2015) ranked Malaysia as
number four out of 189 countries in terms of investor protection. In order to further enhance
efficiencies and promote greater competition in the capital markets, the Malaysian Securities
Commission (MSC) in 2014 embarked on a comprehensive regulatory review. The
institutional reforms include developmental efforts aimed at enhancing the bond market’s
efficiency and reducing transaction costs. In the presence of a functioning bond (debt) market
that lowers transaction costs, Malaysian firms’ managers could easily raise the debt capital
needed to maximize firm value (Matemilola et al., 2018). This study also provides reliable
research-based information for regulators, as a basis to further strengthen the
implementation of the company laws concerning the capital structure requirements.
Moreover, our findings will be useful to firms in other emerging markets when making
decisions.
Our paper contributes to the current literature in many ways. First, it makes an important
contribution to our understanding of the significance of capital market decision making in
emerging economies, specifically in the context of Malaysia. Second, it is among the first
studies to use both the book andmarket value measures of capital structure. It also uses three
proxies for debt: total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt. This measure allows us to
determine the main measures and determinants of capital structure. Third, it incorporates
earning volatility and cash flow volatility as new independent variables in the model. These
variables have not previously been used together with both book andmarket value measures
of capital structure. Fourth, this study also examines the non-monotonic relationship between
a firm’s age and capital structure using a quadratic regression method. Fifth, to analyse the
data, we apply both static techniques (pooled-OLS, random effects, fixed effects, generalized
least squares, panel corrected standard errors and two-stage least squares) and dynamic
panel estimation techniques (difference and system dynamic estimators). By applying the
two-step difference and system dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM), the
research is able to account for potential endogeneity, heterogeneity and autocorrelation
problems, as well as the persistence of capital structure. Sixth, we use a number of
explanatory variables in the context of Malaysia to control for missing variables; the use of
comprehensive and updated data sets is very important in achieving this task. Finally, this
study makes an important contribution to our understanding of the capital structure
decisions of non-financial listed companies in the Malaysia stock market.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theories and literature review.
Section 3 summarizes the hypothesis development. Section 4 covers data and the research





2. Related theories and literature
2.1 Related theories
In the corporate finance literature, two theories of capital structure are relevant: trade-off
theory and pecking order theory.
2.1.1 Trade-off theory. Initially, trade-off theory suggests that the ideal level of debt is
reached when the marginal benefit of debt financing is equivalent to its marginal cost. The
benefits of debt include tax deductibility of interest expenses and reduction of agency costs of
equity derived from excess free cash flows. The costs of debt include higher interest rates and
bankruptcy costs, either direct or indirect, and these may occur in a situation of excessive
debt. The firm can accomplish an ideal capital structure by altering the debt and equity levels
until the marginal benefit of tax shield is equal to the marginal cost of the financial distress.
The trade-off hypothesis proposes that all firms have an ideal debt level. This theory does not
consider information asymmetry, agency cost or pecking order (Bradley et al., 1984). In
general, it proposes that when a business requires capital, the first thing that should be
considered is the trade-off between the benefits and costs of using debt.
2.1.2 Pecking order theory. Myers and Majluf (1984) proposed the pecking order
hypothesis, following the discoveries of Donaldson (1961), that management inclines towards
using internal funds rather than raising external funds. Pecking order theory proposes that a
firm inclines toward internal financing over debt capital. In essence, firms use internal funds
first, followed by external debts issuance and finally external equity offerings. Pecking order
theory further clarifies that firms acquiremore external financingwhen internal funds are not
adequate to satisfy the investment needs (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). The pecking
order theory predicts that high-growth firms, typicallywith large financing needs, will end up
with high debt ratios due to their managers’ unwillingness to issue equity. Equity is less
interesting to firms, given that it entails larger information asymmetry costs, making its
issuance more expensive relative to other funding sources (Baskin, 1989).
2.2 Literature review
There are many empirical studies on the determinants of capital structure. Determining the
factors associated with debt ratios depends on the two opposing theories outlined above:
trade-off theory and pecking order theory. However, Frank and Goyal (2008) and Harris and
Roark (2019) provide a rationale for why, even with these two dominating theories, capital
structure theory lacks a single model to help identify the determinants of capital structure
choice.
Prior research finds that the capital structure of a firm is influenced not only by
firm-specific factors but also by country-specific factors (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; De Jong
et al., 2008). Single-country studies normally try to use firm-specific factors to explain
differences in capital structure. International studies, on the other hand, compare the
differences in the capital structure among firms from different countries, and try to use both
firm- and country-specific factors to provide explanations. The general conclusion is that
both firm- and country-specific factors have significant explanatory power on the formation
of capital structure. Frank andGoyal (2009) conduct a study using a large number of potential
factors in the capital structure choice, based on previous work. Using the many possible
determinants, they identify factors that provide the greatest explanation of capital structure.
These factors are: market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, firm profitability, firm size and
expected inflation. Since these determinants were identified, they have been used to some
degree by much of the capital structure literature, including Alipour et al. (2015), K€oksal and
Orman (2015), Paredes Gomez et al. (2016), Sofat and Singh (2017), Vo (2017), Khemiri and
Noubbigh (2018), Matemilola et al. (2018), Li and Islam (2019), Moradi and Paulet (2019) and
Ramli et al. (2019). There is evidence that other factors may also have some influence over the
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capital structure decision. For example, Vo (2017) finds that the determinants of capital
structure are different for long-term and short-term indicators, suggesting that larger firms
tend to use long-term debt while smaller firms use short-term debt to finance their
investments. This may be because larger firms do not take advantage of having more
bargaining power over creditors or bankers than smaller firms to borrow long term; also,
liquidity problems limit the firm from borrowing long term, and liquidity management is a
critical issue for success. Harris and Roark (2019) find that firms with higher cash flow
volatility have higher debt levels, but this positive link is only for firms with the weakest
financial performance as measured by operating cash flow. When firms are ranked based on
operating cash flow, those in the bottom half increase their use of leverage in the face of
increasing cash flow risk. For firms with operating cash flows that are in the upper half, the
link between cash flow risk faced by the firm and its use of leverage is not statistically
significant.
Most of the empirical studies considered developed countries, principally the United
States (Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1995)
show that firm-specific determinants are correlated with debt ratios for US non-financial
firms. This result is very similar to those obtained for the other G7 countries. Based on this
work, a growing number of studies have focused on international comparison in order to
analyse the leverage determinants (for example, Wald, 1999; De Jong et al., 2008). In addition,
several empirical studies have investigated the determinants of capital structure in developed
countries (Kremp and St€oss, 2001; Chen, 2004; and Gaud et al., 2005). However, since the
mid-1990s, a number of studies have examined the determinants of leverage in developing
countries (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Pandey, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006; Qureshi, 2009;
K€oksal and Orman, 2015; Paredes Gomez et al., 2016). In this context, the pioneering study of
Booth et al. (2001) shows that financial factors affecting the choice of financing in developing
countries are similar to those in developed countries. However, the observed difference
emerges at the level of country-specific macroeconomic factors. Certainly, the empirical
literature has used several contexts (developed and developing economies). However, it
neglects Malaysia. Although there is little evidence in this context, our paper is most closely
related to this last strand of literature since we examine the capital structure decisions of
non-financial firms in Malaysia.
Deesomsak et al. (2004) investigate the determinants of capital structure in the Asia–
Pacific region using data from Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. With regards
to firm-specific determinants, they report that firm size is positively related to leverage while
growth and liquidity are negatively related to it. De Jong et al. (2008) analyse the importance
of firm-specific and country-specific factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries.
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) report that firm size in France, Greece, Portugal and Italy is
positively correlated with leverage, while asset structure, profitability and risk are negatively
explained by capital structure. Meanwhile, growth is not a statistically significant
determinant of leverage for any of the four countries; in other words, they find that firm-
specific effects are more responsible for the differences in the determinants of capital
structure than country-specific effects.
Sbeti and Moosa (2012) employ extreme bound analysis to investigate capital structure
determinants using Kuwaiti data and report that the results are more supportive of pecking
order theory than the trade-off theory. They provide evidence for the importance of growth
opportunities and profitability. Recent work also provides evidence on the relationship
between costs associated with discharging workers and capital structure decisions (Serfling,
2016). Using cash flow as an explanatory variable, Mateev et al. (2013) test some of the
predictions of pecking order theory. According to this theory, firms with more available
internal funds should use less external funding. This study finds strong evidence to support




between profitability and leverage. Santos et al. (2014) seek to examine how capital structure
is affected by ownership concentration in the hands of the main shareholder: whether family
firms differ in terms of the choice of funding sources and highlighting the role of multiple
large shareholders. A number of recent papers describe single-country studies of capital
structure (Chang et al., 2014a,b; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Handoo and Sharma, 2014) and specific
factors explaining it (Antonczyk and Salzmann, 2014; Chang et al., 2014a,b; Dang et al., 2014;
Danis et al., 2014; Hugonnier et al., 2015).
From this analysis, it is clear that the results of these empirical studies differ. Some of the
findings are consistent with trade-off theory and others with pecking order theory, although
neither is uniformly better than the other. Table 1 summarizes the results from a number of
empirical studies.
3. Measurement of variables and hypothesis development
3.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable used in this research is the capital structure. In the empirical
literature, there are several measures of capital structure. Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest
that short-term, long-term and total debts over total assets ratios are more appropriate
measures of financial leverage than the ratio of liabilities to total assets, because they provide
a better indication of whether the firm is at risk of default in the immediate future, and present
a more accurate picture of past financing choices. Previous studies mostly use either book
debt ratios or market debt ratios as proxy for capital structure (Chen, 2004; Frank and Goyal,
2009; K€oksal and Orman, 2015; Matemilola et al., 2018; Ramli et al., 2019). However, this paper
describes the use of both ratios as a robustness test. We use book total debt, long-term debt
and short-term ratios because they are not affected by stock price fluctuation, unlike market
debt ratios. Specifically, capital structure is measured as the ratio of book value of total debt
to book value of total assets, the ratio of book value of long-term debt to book value of total
assets, the ratio of book value of short-term debt to book value of total assets, the ratio of book
value of total debt to market value of equity plus book value to total debt, the ratio of book
value of long-term debt to market value of equity plus book value of long-term debt, and the
ratio of book value of short-term debt to market value of equity plus book value of short-
term debt.
3.2 Independent variables
3.2.1 Profitability. In order to estimate profitability, two ratios are used: return on asset (ROA)
and return on equity (ROE). ROA is measured by earnings before interest and taxes to total
assets (Booth et al., 2001; K€oksal and Orman, 2015). ROE is measured by earnings before
interest and taxes to total equity. We employ ROA and ROE calculated by earnings before
interest and taxes deflated by total assets as a proxy for profitability because not only is it
calculated regardless of the interest due and regardless of the tax levied by the respective
government, but it is also the appropriated measure of profitability when we aim at gauging
the tax benefits of debt financing (Moradi and Paulet, 2019). The relationship between
profitability and capital structure is both theoretically and empirically controversial (Friend
and Lang, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Sbeti and
Moosa, 2012; Vo, 2017). More specifically, Modigliani and Miller (1963) state that a company
may opt for debt in order to take advantage of tax shields. Moreover, there is a positive
relationship between profitability and the existence of free cash flow problems and in these
circumstances debt may act as a management tool to ensure that managers do not pursue
individual objectives (Jensen, 1986). Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that creditors prefer to
give loans to firms with high current cash flow. In addition, La Rocca et al. (2009) argue that
more profitable firms are more likely to borrow more in order to benefit from the tax shield
(Frank and Goyal, 2003, 2009). Vo (2017) finds that profitable firms tend to borrow long term
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while reducing short-term debt. According to trade-off theory, profitable firms could utilize
tax credit (Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018); they also have a low probability of bankruptcy (Vo,
2017). Thus, this theory predicts a positive relationship between profitability and leverage.
However, pecking order theory suggests that firms with high profits maintain internal funds
(Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018). In other words, pecking order theory suggests that profitable
firms will have more retained earnings, and become less leveraged. Unprofitable firms, on the
other hand, are associated with higher leverage ratios. Therefore, a significant negative
relationship exists between leverage and profitability; that is, a profitable firm tends to use
internal funds to meet its financing needs (Fama and French, 2002; Moradi and Paulet, 2019).
H1. Profitability has a relationship with capital structure. According to trade-off theory,
it has a positive relationship with debts, and to pecking order theory a negative
relationship with debts.
3.2.2 Growth opportunities. Three ratios are used to calculate growth opportunity: first, the




Moradi and Paulet (2019) 1999–2015 6 European countries Developed Trade-off and
Pecking order
Li and Islam (2019) 1999–2012 Australia Developed Trade-off and
Pecking order






2006–2016 5 African countries Developing Trade-off and
Pecking order
Matemilola et al. (2018) 2008–2012 Malaysia Developing Trade-off
Sofat and Singh (2017) 2002–2012 India Developing Trade-off
Vo (2017) 2006–2015 Vietnam Developing Trade-off and
Pecking order
Paredes Gomez et al.
(2016)
2004–2014 5 Latin American
countries
Developing Pecking order
Alipour et al. (2015) 2003–2007 Iran Developing Pecking order
K€oksal and Orman (2015) 1996–2009 Turkey Developing Trade-off
Frank and Goyal (2009) 1945–2002 USA Developed Trade-off
Qureshi (2009) 1972–2005 Pakistan Developing Pecking order
De Jong et al. (2008) 1997–2001 42 countries Developed Pecking order
Antoniou et al. (2008) 1987–2000 UK Developed Trade-off
Huang and Song (2006) 1994–2003 China Developing Trade-off
Gaud et al. (2005) 1991–2000 Switzerland Developed Trade-off and
Pecking order
Chen (2004) 1995–2000 China Developed Pecking order
Pandey (2004) 1994–2000 Malaysia Developing Pecking order
Kremp and St€oss (2001) 1987–1985 France Developed Pecking order




Wiwattanakantang (1999) 1986–1996 Thailand Developing Trade-off




1974–1982 USA Developed Trade-off and
Pecking order
Bradley et al. (1984) 1962–1981 USA Developed Trade-off








second, the variation of the tangible assets between time t and t1 divided by the tangible
assets at time t1 (Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018); and third, the ratio of market capitalization
plus long-term debt to total assets (Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018; Jubilee et al., 2018). The first
displays all investments in the firm, not distinguishing between expansion and economic
growth. The last shows the intangible investment opportunities, more specifically in future,
and captures the economic growth of a firm based on entrepreneurial activities to introduce
newproducts or services. Tobin’sQ is used as another proxy because it reflects how investors
regard the company (Ramli et al., 2019; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). There are conflicting
theoretical and empirical predictions on the effects of growth on leverage.While some studies
(De Jong et al., 2008) conclude a significant inverse relationship between growth and leverage,
others (Fama and French, 2002; Hall et al., 2000) find a significant direct correlation. Some
authors, such as Rajagopal (2011) and Yang et al. (2010), find both positive and negative signs
for the coefficients of growth based on the proxies used in their studies. Vo (2017) finds that
growth opportunity measured by Tobin’s Q has a positive and significant effect on the long-
term to short-term debt ratio. Higher-market value firms tend to usemore debt to finance their
investment. This indicates that higher-growth firms are unable to take advantage of new
equity issue in stock markets. However, Berens and Cuny (1995), Lemmon et al. (2008) and
Gormley and Matsa (2013) find that growth opportunity implies high equity financing and
less leverage. Based on agency theory of capital structure, when there are growth
opportunities, a firm will reduce its debt financing to avoid conflict between debt-holder and
shareholder. According to Myers (1977) and La Rocca et al. (2009), there is a negative
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage because, in order to borrow more
money, the firm must maintain financial flexibility especially if it has high growth
opportunities. Firms with high growth opportunities are unlikely to issue debt finance since
the intangible assets will lose value when it comes to bankruptcy. However, according to
pecking order theory, there is also a possibility that growth opportunities have a positive
relationship with leverage. According to Myers (1984), firms with high growth opportunity
would prioritize their financing needs using internal funds. However, since their internal
funds are insufficient to finance all the investment needs, they have to raise external funds.
As a result, many firms choose debt as the first option for funding projects and creating
higher leverage (Vo, 2017). Consequently, the association between growth and leverage is not
as simple as previous studies might seem to suggest and we are undecided about this
relationship.
H2. There is a significant relationship between growth opportunity and capital structure.
3.2.3 Collateral. Following researchers such as Chen (2004) and Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018),
we use tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets to measure collateral.
We adopt this proxy because it explicitly shows the collateral value of total assets and
provides firms with the opportunity to match the maturity of their debt with the lifespan of
their assets. The trade-off theory suggests that tangible assets are important and positively
determine capital structure. On the one hand, because tangible assets can be used as collateral
(thus lowering the creditor’s risk of suffering such agency costs of debt), a high proportion of
tangible assets allows firms to obtain external finance easily, resulting in a high leverage
(Titman andWessels, 1988; Sbeti andMoosa, 2012). According to Hovakimian et al. (2001), De
Jong et al. (2008) and Yang et al. (2010), there is a positive relationship between asset
tangibility and leverage because firms can use tangible assets as collateral to take advantage
of tax deductibility and to make lenders feel more secure. As suggested by Rajan and
Zingales (1995), if a firm provides high tangible assets, the agency costs of the debt can be
reduced because tangible assets are easy to collateralize. Jensen and Meckling (1976) affirm
that if firms do not have collateral for their debt, moral hazard and hence agency costs of debt
increase (La Rocca et al., 2009). Ramli et al. (2019) argue that although the use of higher
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leverage or a lower equity capital ratio can increase a firm’s financial performance, the firm
may also consider investing in fixed assets to enhance shareholders’ wealth. In other words,
the role of asset tangibility as collateral in borrowing might lead to an increase in the firm’s
financial performance via increases in its leverage. The existence of debt agency costs like
risk shifting, and the potential problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, may induce
creditors to require guarantees to their lending, materialized in collateral assets (Myers, 1977;
Harris and Raviv, 1991). This kind of asset will retain value in the case of a potential
liquidation of the firm and could be sold in the market to meet the firm’s payment
commitments. Thus, firm leverage is positively related to asset tangibility.
H3. There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and capital structure.
3.2.4 Corporate tax. This variable is measured by dividing the difference between profit
before tax and profit after tax by the profit before tax at time t (Booth et al., 2001; Khemiri and
Noubbigh, 2018). According to trade-off theory, there is a positive relationship between
corporate tax and capital structure since firms could use debt to reduce tax paymentwhen the
corporate tax rate is high. A high tax rate imposed on firms will make the firms more willing
to purchase fixed assets using debt (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980). In addition, Modigliani
and Miller (1958) and Bradley et al. (1984) argue that the higher the corporate tax, the more
debt firms use in order to benefit from tax (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Bradley et al., 1984).
H4. There is a positive relationship between corporate tax and capital structure.
3.2.5 Tax shields. Following the studies of De Angelo and Masulis (1980) and Moradi and
Paulet (2019), we use a proxy of total tax (annual tax expenses) to earnings before interest and
tax to measure the debt tax shield, because the amount of tax payable by a firm is scaled
down by the magnitude of corresponding total assets to provide an appropriate measure for
comparing taxable capacity. De Angelo and Masulis (1980), Walsh and Ryan (1997) and
Moradi and Paulet (2019) find that interest which is tax deductible positively influences debt
issue. Therefore, we expect to find support for a direct relationship between leverage and tax
shield.
H5. The tax shield has a negative relationship with capital structure.
3.2.6 Non-debt tax shields. This variable is calculated by using the ratio of depreciation
expense to total assets (Chen, 2004; Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018). We use this measure
because the higher level of depreciation and amortization expenses reduces the amount of
taxable income, discouraging firms from using more debt. Regardless of the industry in
which the firm is doing business, these expenses are almost always reported in income
statements, so the availability of the data is guaranteed (Moradi and Paulet, 2019). A
substitute for tax benefit of debt financing is the non-debt tax shield. In addition, the trade-off
theory predicts a negative relationship between non-debt-tax shields and leverage (De Jong
et al., 2008; Bradley et al., 1984). It is expected that non-debt tax shields could affect leverage
negatively as they are substitutes for reducing tax payments. Moreover, companies with
large amounts of non-debt tax shieldsmust limit their access to external financing. Rajagopal
(2011) and Moradi and Paulet (2019) assert a significantly negative linkage between leverage
and non-debt tax shields. The reason is that tax deductibility of certain items such as
depreciation, amortization, depletion, advertising, research and development, investment tax
credits and operating tax loss carry-forward credits reduces not only the end-of-period
earnings before interest and tax, but also the tax advantage of issuing debt.
H6. Non-debt tax shields have a negative relationship with capital structure.
3.2.7 Liquidity. Liquidity is measured by current assets to current liabilities. It is commonly




hand, based on trade-off theory, firmswith high liquidity can use high debt due to their ability
to meet their obligation (Vo, 2017). This implies a positive relationship between a firm’s
liquidity position and debt ratios; firms that have a high level of liquidity (large short-term
assets), have lower liquidity risks and borrow more debt, because of their ability to repay the
debt. On the other hand, the pecking order theory shows that firms with high liquidity will be
able to use their internal funds to finance their investments (Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018). In
other words, a negative relationship between leverage and liquidity is expected because firms
with more debt are associated with higher liabilities and lower remaining current assets.
Moreover, agency theory suggests that when the agency costs of liquidity are high, outside
creditors tend to reduce the debt financing limit available to firms (Myers and Rajan 1998).
Mateev et al. (2013) stress that since small firms usually have a higher proportion of current
liabilities in their capital structure compared to large firms, a firm’s ability to sustain short-
term liquidity is expected to be positively related to its growth. Thus, firmswithmore growth
opportunities will keep higher liquidity levels and thus will face less severe financing
constraints. These firms will employ lower (short-term) leverage ratios.
H7. Liquidity has an impact on capital structure.
3.2.8 Earning volatility. This variable is measured by the standard deviation of operating
income to total asset. The standard deviation is measured over the past five years including
the current year (De Jong et al., 2008; K€oksal and Orman, 2015; Harris and Roark, 2019). It is a
properly scaled measure for observing the firm’s ability to satisfy fixed charges. This
variable shows the uncertainty of future income streams and the risk. As income is a key
factor in the ability to meet interest charges and to pay dividends, we anticipate that earnings
volatility is negatively correlated with capital structure. That is, when earnings volatility is
high, firms are relatively incapable of issuing debt or equity because investors and lenders
are unwilling to put their money in a firm with a high risk of default or bankruptcy (Moradi
and Paulet, 2019). Firms with high earnings volatility carry the risk that their earnings level
may drop below debt-servicing commitment. Such unfavourable occurrences may result in
re-arranging funding at a higher cost or facing the risk of bankruptcy (Lemmon et al., 2008). In
addition, the trade-off and pecking order theories reveal that the association between
earnings volatility and debt is negative, indicating that an increase in earnings volatility is
expected to increase the possibility of a firm experiencing bankruptcy. This is because an
increase in the volatility of the earnings simultaneously exposes the firm to the risk of
inability to repay the interest and debt. The debt level of a firm cannot directly affect this
indicator, as the optimal level of debt decreases the earnings volatility (Khemiri and
Noubbigh, 2018). Some findings (Rajagopal, 2011; Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018; Moradi
and Paulet, 2019) support our reasoning, but a few authors (Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Fama
and French, 2002) identify a direct relationship consistent with the agency cost of debt,
resulting in risky firms borrowing more.
H8. Earning volatility has a negative impact on capital structure.
3.2.9 Cash flow volatility. Following Harris and Roark (2019), Frank and Goyal (2009) and
Bates et al. (2009), this variable is measured by the standard deviation (over the past five
years including the current year) of operating cash flow to sales. There are two recently
documented trends in finance which affect how firms make capital structure decisions. First,
there is evidence that an increase in cash flow volatility (Bates et al., 2009) may lead to cash
shortfalls. Second, given the fact that increases in cash flow risk may either create more need
for cash to fund operations or increase the probability of a firm running out of cash during a
given fiscal year, firms are more likely to issue debt as a response. Unexpected negative
changes in cash flows or the continued inability to generate positive operating cash flows
may result in firms not generating sufficient cash flows to cover their cash requirements for
APJBA
sustaining and growing their business (Harris and Roark, 2019). Huang and Ritter (2018)
show that in cases where firms have near-term cash needs, they are more likely to issue debt
than equity. The authors also find that firms at risk of running out of cash in a particular
fiscal year are 11 times more likely to issue debt than firms that do not face the same risk.
Harris and Roark (2019) find that cash flow volatility has a positive and significant
relationship with the use of debt in the capital structure. However, Mateev et al. (2013) find
that if firms have more available internal funds, then they will take fewer external funds,
which supports pecking order theory. Furthermore, Memon et al. (2018) indicate that firms
which face higher cash flow volatility tend to choose debt with shorter maturity.
H9. Cash flow volatility has an impact on the relationship with debt.
3.3 Control variables
This study also incorporates several control variables. First, the size of the firm is employed
to control for a firm’s ability to use collateral in securing loans. We use the natural logarithm
of total assets to measure this variable (Harris and Roark, 2019; Memon et al., 2018; Frank and
Goyal, 2009; Bates et al., 2009). Second, to take into account the reputation of the firm, we use
firm age measured by the number of years since its establishment. The older the firm, the
higher the amount of financing used (Diamond, 1989; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Harris and
Roark, 2019). Third, GDP growth rate is used to manage and control for the economic
condition. Pecking order theory argues that during economic expansion, leverage should
decline since there are sufficient funds from internal sources. Fourth, to control for
uncertainty of the economic environment, we use the inflation ratemeasured by the consumer
price index (Harris and Roark, 2019; Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018). Fifth, to control for the
ability of the firm to employ more debt, we follow Harris and Roark (2019) and Khemiri and
Noubbigh (2018) to include the nominal interest rate. A high interest rate implies the inability
of firms to employ more debt. Sixth, market capitalization is used to measure the degree of
financial market development. It is calculated by using themarket capitalization to GDP ratio
(Harris and Roark, 2019; Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018; Booth et al., 2001). Lastly, we include
industry and year effects as dummy variables. The industry effects variable takes 1 if a firm
belongs to a particular industry and zero otherwise, while year effect takes 1 for a specific
time period and zero otherwise (Titman andWessels, 1988; Frank andGoyal, 2009; Harris and
Roark, 2019). A summary of variable measurements and their expected signs is presented in
Table 2.
4. Methodology and data
4.1 Methodology
This section focuses on formulating the model that will be used to examine the determinants
of the capital structure decision of Malaysian firms. The model is set up from the capital
structure theories to enable us to shed light on the question of whether the capital structure
decision in emerging economies is different from that in developed ones. Factors that may
affect a firm’s capital structure are based on the capital structure theories and the
preponderance of existing capital structure studies in the current literature. Specifically, firm-
specific variables explaining capital structure are selected: profitability, growth opportunity,
collateral, corporate tax, tax shields, non-debt-tax shields, liquidity, earning volatility and
cash flow volatility.
The study follows Saif-alyousfi (2019), Moradi and Paulet (2019), Li and Islam (2019),
Ramli et al. (2019), Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018), Matemilola et al. (2018), Saif-Alyousfi et al.
(2018a,b,c) and Vo (2017) in employing both static and dynamic panel estimation techniques.









Book value of total
debt
TDBV The ratio of book value of total debt (short-termdebtþ
long-term debt) to book value of total assets
Book value of long-
term debt
LTDBV The ratio of book value of long-term debt to book
value of total assets
Book value of short-
term debt
STDBV The ratio of book value of short-term debt to book
value of total assets
Market value of total
debt
TDMV The ratio of book value of total debt to (market value
of equity þ book value to total debt)
Market value of long-
term debt
LTDMV The ratio of book value of long-term debt to (market
value of equity þ book value of long-term debt)
Market value of
short-term debt
STDMV The ratio of book value of short-term debt to (market
value of equity þ book value of short-term debt)
Independent variables








The ratio of the change in total assets between time t
and t-1 divided by total assets at time t-1
The ratio of the variation of the tangible assets
between the time t and t-1 divided by the tangible
assets at time t-1
Appropriate for the ratio of market capitalization plus
long-term debt to total assets
þ/
Collaterals COLLA The ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and
equipment) divided by total assets
þ
Corporate tax CORTAX This variable is defined as the difference between
profit after tax and profit before tax at time t
þ
Tax shields TAXSHIEL The ratio of total income taxes to total earnings before
interest and tax

Non-debt-tax shields NONTAX The ratio of depreciation to total assets þ
Liquidity LIQUID The ratio of current assets divided by current
liabilities
þ/
Earning volatility EARNVOL The standard deviation (over the past 5 years
including the current year) of EBIT over total assets

Cash flow volatility CASHVOL The standard deviation (over the past 5 years




Firm size SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets þ/
Firm age AGE The number of years since its creation þ/
GDP growth rate GDP Annual GDP growth rate þ/
Inflation rate INF The Consumer Price Index þ/
Interest rate LIR Lending interest rate (%) þ/
Market
capitalization
MARCAP Market capitalization to GDP ratio þ/
Industry effects Industry
effect
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a
particular industry and zero otherwise. One industry
should be excluded to avoid dummy variable trap
Year effects Year effect Dummy variable equal to 1 for a specific time period
and zero otherwise. One year should be excluded to






effects (FE) model, generalized least squares (GLS), panel corrected standard errors (PCSE)
and two-stage least squares (2SLS). The dynamic techniques are the one-step and two-step
systems and difference GMM estimators.
To evaluate the determinants of capital structure of firms inMalaysia, Eq. (1) is calculated
with the static panel estimation techniques. To choose between cross-section pooled OLS and
the RE model, the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test examines the null
hypothesis that there are no random effects. This hypothesis, if rejected, implies that the
cross-section pooled OLS technique is inappropriate. Then, in order to choose between the RE
and FE models, the Hausman specification test examines the null hypothesis that RE is
consistent and efficient. Likewise, if this hypothesis is rejected, then the estimation results
from the FE model will be found to be the more robust.
The GLS technique is robust to any first-order autoregressive disturbances within
unbalanced panels and cross-sectional correlation and/or heteroscedasticity across panels
(Wooldridge, 2009). The authors argue that the GLSmodel is more appropriate as it takes into
account problems that exist in the data, such as normality and homoscedasticity.
Furthermore, GLS is a transformed model of OLS but is more appropriate in the case of
non-normal data (Gujarati, 2003); estimations by the GLS technique are especially suitable for
data sets where serial correlation and/or heteroscedasticity might be present. Saif-alyousfi
(2019) stresses that the GLS estimator is more efficient than FE and RE estimators.
Hoechle (2007, 2010) stresses that most common panel data estimators, with the exception
of PCSE, are unable to handle serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence
simultaneously. PCSE is a two-step, modified version of ‘inefficient’ OLS and it performs
substantially better than other estimators (i.e. pooled OLS, RE, FE and GLS estimators) when
there are serial-correlation and cross-sectional dependence problems in the panel data
(Hoechle, 2007, 2010). Beck and Katz (1995) also argue that the PCSEmethod yields robust co-
variances, as has been suggested in the analysis of panel data. It also accounts for deviations
from the spherical errors, drawing meaningful inferences on the estimates from panel data.
Although panel data methods (pooled OLS, RE, FE, GLS and PCSE) solve the problem of
time-constant omitted variables, alone they do not solve the problem of time-varying omitted
variables that are correlated with the explanatory variables. Moreover, firm-wise
heteroscedasticity can be reasonably expected to exist in the estimation process. The 2SLS
approach is used to overcome this problem. This study therefore uses the 2SLS instrumental
variable estimator because the empirical model may raise endogeneity concerns. The 2SLS
method is used to eliminate the constant unobserved effect and a unit-root process.
CapStructureit ¼ β0 þ β1PROFITit þ β2GRWTA1it þ β3GRWTNA2it þ β4GRWTQ3it
þβ5COLLAit þ β6CORTAXit þ β7TAXSHIELit þ β8NONTAXit
þβ9LIQUIDit þ β10EARNVOLit þ β11CASHVOLit þ β12SIZEit







where CapStructureit is the capital structure indicators (TDBV, LTDBV, STDBV, TDMV,
LTDMV and STDMV) of firm i over the period t. PROFIT is the profitability ratio measured
by return on assets. GRWTA1 is the ratio of the change in total assets between time t and t1
divided by total assets at time t1. GRTWA2 is the ratio of the variation of the tangible assets
between the time t and t1 divided by the tangible assets at time t1. GRWTQ3 is
appropriate for the ratio ofmarket capitalization plus long-termdebt to total assets. COLLA is
the collateral measured by the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment)




before tax and profit after tax divided by profit before tax at time t. TAXSHIEL is the tax
shields measured by the ratio of total income taxes to total assets. NONTAX is the non-debt
tax measured by the ratio of depreciation to total assets. LIQUID is the liquidity measured by
the ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities. EARNVOL is the earnings volatility
measured by the standard deviation (over the past five years including the current year) of
EBIT over total assets. CASHVOL is the cash flow volatility measured by the standard
deviation (over the past five years including the current year) of operating cash flow to sales.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. AGE is the number of years since its creation.
GDP is annual GDP growth rate. INF is inflation rate measured by the consumer price index.
LIR is lending interest rate.MARCAP is themarket capitalization to GDP ratio. INDUSTRY is
the dummy for industry sector effects; Year is the dummy for time effects and εit is the error
term. The dynamic model of Eq. (1) can be expressed as follows:
CapStructureit ¼ β0 þ β1CapStructureit−1 þ β2PROFITit þ β3GRWTA1it
þβ4GRWTNA2it þ β5GRWTQ3it þ β6COLLAit þ β7CORTAXit
þβ8TAXSHIELit þ β9NONTAXit þ β10LIQUIDit þ β11EARNVOLit
þβ12CASHVOLit þ β13SIZEit þ β14AGEit þ β15GDPit þ β16INFit







Gaud et al. (2005) and Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018) suggest that capital structure is dynamic
by nature. However, Baltagi (2008) stresses that FE and RE models are biased in a dynamic
model of panel data. He also argues that pooledOLS is biased and inconsistent even if εit is not
serially associated. In addition, the application of traditional OLS methods to estimate
parameters in a dynamic model that includes firm-specific effects and a lagged dependent
variable would produce biased coefficients (Flannery and Hankins, 2013). GMM is more
efficient than 2SLS because it accounts for normality, autocorrelation heteroscedasticity and
endogeneity problems (Hall, 2005; Lee et al., 2015). Therefore, this study also applies the panel
difference and system GMM method because it is recognized as one of the best methods to
estimate parameters of the target capital structure in the presence of firm-specific effects and
lagged dependent variables (Flannery and Hankins, 2013). The model is estimated with
difference and systemGMMestimators because debt displays persistent behaviour (Lemmon
et al., 2008). Moreover, we use GMM because there is the possibility of reverse causality
between debt and managers’ experience and reverse causality between debt and other
explanatory variables. In short, this study uses the dynamic GMM estimator since capital
structure determinants may suffer from endogeneity bias, omitted variables and the high
persistence of firm capital structure measures (TDBV, LTDBV, STDBV, TDMV, LTDMV
and STDMV). GMM also uses lagged values of independent and dependent variables in
variance instruments. The system GMM estimator is employed because it is more robust in
improving efficiency gains and reducing finite sample bias (Blundell and Bond, 2000). It also
addresses the unit root property problem and provides more accurate findings (Bond, 2002).
The validity of the instruments is examined by the Sargan/Hansen-test for over-identifying
restrictions and a test for the absence of residual serial correlation.
4.2 Data
The data set used in this research is the accounting data of all non-financial listed companies
on the Malaysia stock market for the last 14 years. In other words, our sample consists of 827
non-financial listed firms during the period 2008–2017. The data used are all annual. Banks
and financial companies are excluded from our sample as they are subject to strong
APJBA
regulations, including capital requirements (King and Santor, 2008; Vo, 2017; Khemiri and
Noubbigh, 2018). Data for the firm-specific factors are gathered from the Thomson Reuter
DataStream as well as firms’ balance sheets and income statements. Data for macroeconomic
variables are collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.
As shown in Table 3, the average value of TDBV, LTDBV, STDBV, TDMV, LTDMV and
STDMV is estimated at 0.195, 0.090, 0.106, 0.285, 0.156 and 0.196, respectively. It is interesting
to observe that, on average, Malaysian firms tend to use much more short-term debt than
long-term debt. This may be due to the fact that the level of development of the bond market
inMalaysia is low,making it difficult for companies to access long-term financing. It may also
be due to the unstable economic environment and changes in the macroeconomic policy of
emerging markets.
The correlation coefficients between the variables can be found in Table 4. The correlation
analysis reports that the degree of relationship among the variables used in this study isweak
because the correlation coefficients are lower between the independent variables and
statistically significant. Thus, there is no multicollinearity problem between the independent
variables.
5. Empirical results
5.1 Determinants of capital structure: study of the relationship by different estimation
methods
First, we estimate the model using static panel estimation techniques. The results are
presented in Columns 1–6 of Tables 4–10. We first estimate the model with cross-section
pooled OLS. The result shows that all coefficients have the correct signs and most are
statistically significant at 1 or 5% levels. Similarly, the estimation results for the RE model
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
TDBV 7,682 0.195 0.160 0.000 0.653 0.698 2.801
LTDBV 7,616 0.090 0.113 0.000 0.544 1.821 6.390
STDBV 7,625 0.106 0.110 0.000 0.475 1.319 4.267
TDMV 7,372 0.285 0.242 0.000 0.864 0.576 2.220
LTDMV 7,306 0.156 0.184 0.000 0.745 1.346 4.097
STDMV 7,317 0.196 0.210 0.000 0.806 1.109 3.293
PROFIT 7,661 0.050 0.107 0.431 0.361 1.143 8.285
GRWTA1 7,537 0.084 0.220 0.315 0.983 1.857 8.363
GRWTNA2 7,505 0.100 0.382 0.534 1.598 2.178 9.224
GRWTQ3 7,306 0.778 0.633 0.144 3.299 2.147 8.033
COLLA 7,629 0.340 0.230 0.003 0.952 0.607 2.774
CORTAX 7,659 0.175 0.499 1.768 1.907 0.514 9.662
TAXSHIEL 7,642 0.013 0.016 0.022 0.077 1.266 5.653
NONTAX 7,651 0.029 0.027 0.000 0.152 2.025 8.669
LIQUID 7,373 2.682 2.392 0.483 11.61 2.271 8.178
EARNVOL 6,630 0.054 0.055 0.007 0.273 2.248 8.294
CASHVOL 6,232 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.006 3.044 11.10
SIZE 7,648 12.75 1.614 9.341 17.38 0.499 3.202
AGE 7,790 21.42 16.08 1.000 107.0 1.548 6.568
GDP 4.742 2.247 1.514 7.425 1.952 6.226
INF 2.589 1.296 0.583 5.441 0.726 3.076
LIR 4.880 0.440 4.544 6.080 1.888 5.633
MARCAP 135.2 20.99 81.988 160.3 1.371 4.450
Note(s): This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the analysis. Data is
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































have the expected signs, and most of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10%
level or better. The goodness-of-fit tests also indicate that bothmodels are well fitted, with the
R-square statistics greater than 0.37. Nevertheless, the Breusch-Pagan LM test rejects the null
hypothesis of no random effect, implying that the estimation results with the RE model are
more robust than the cross-section pooled OLS.
Next, we compare the RE and FE models using the Hausman specification test. It finds
that the statistics reject the null hypothesis of the RE model consistently and efficiently. For
this reason, we conclude that the results from the FE model are more appropriate.
Unfortunately, the selected FEmodel is imperfect because it fails to pass the diagnostic tests.
More specifically, the error-variance generated by the selected FE model is unequal (i.e.
heteroscedasticity) and the residuals are serially correlated.
To overcome these problems, we re-estimate the selected FE model using the GLS, PCSE
and 2SLS estimators. The results are shown in Tables 5–10 and indicate that most of the
coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level or better. Generally, R-square shows
that 35.5% of the variation in capital structure for firms in Malaysia can be explained by the
variables selected in this study. Obviously, these models are well fitted andmost explanatory
variables are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels.
Nonetheless, prior studies argue that the capital structures of firms are complex and
dynamic in nature. The Hausman tests show that the endogeneity problem is a major issue,
which implies that static panel estimations are not efficient. Prior studies such as Ramli et al.
(2019), Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018) and Matemilola et al. (2018) also argue that when
estimating capital structure, researchers face a number of challenges such as endogeneity,
unobservable heterogeneity as well as the persistence of debt. Thus, in order to examine the
determinants of capital structure over time, the model must also be dynamic. In this regard,
the static panel estimation may be less accurate in the present context. The authors stress that
the dynamic GMM estimator is the appropriate method to solve all of these problems. The
results of the two-step difference and system GMM estimator are presented in the last two
columns of Tables 5–10. Initially, we estimate the model using the one-step difference and
system GMM estimator with one period-lagged dependent variable. Nevertheless, the Sargan
test for one-step difference and system GMM estimation rejects the null hypothesis of over-
identifying restrictions. The results are not shown in the tables in order to save space. Similarly,
the p-value of the Sargan test andAR(2) for two-step differenceGMMrejects the null hypothesis
of over-identifying restrictions (see Tables 5–10). Therefore, we conclude that the one-step
difference, two-step difference, and one-step system GMM estimations may not be suitable in
this context and proceed to estimate the model using the two-step system dynamic GMM
estimator.
The estimations of the two-step system dynamic GMM estimator indicate stable
coefficients. The Sargan test indicates no evidence of over-identification restrictions. The
analyses suggest the existence of a negative first-order autocorrelation; however, this does
not mean that the assessments are inconsistent. Arellano and Bond (1991) argue that
inconsistency may be indicated if second-order autocorrelation is present. However, this case
is rejected by the test for AR(2) errors and hence themoment conditions of themodel are valid
(Tables 5–10). With these diagnostic tests, the study could infer that the two-step system
dynamic GMM estimation is robust and that the standard errors are unbiased. Therefore,
interpretation could be made based upon these results.
The extremely significant coefficients of the lagged dependent variables TDBV, LTDBV,
STDBV, TDMV, LTDMV and STDMV emphasize the dynamic nature of the model
specification and its significance (0.54, 0.42, 0.36, 0.37, 0.56 and 0.31) across all models. This





As shown in Tables 5–10, the two-step system dynamic GMM estimator shows that the
effect of profitability on all measurements of both book and market value of the capital
structure (total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt) is negative and significant at the level
of 1%. This indicates that firms with higher profitability tend to undertake less debt in
Malaysia. This could be explained by the fact that Malaysian firms need to review their
reinvestment strategies by relying on internal resources rather than debt. This result is not in
line with the trade-off theory, that highly profitable firms take out credits to benefit from tax
saving. However, it does confirm the pecking order and asymmetric information theories which
argue that firms with high profits retain more internal funds. These theories also argue that
firms raise capital by resorting to retained earnings, debt and issuing new equity, in exactly this
order (Jensen, 1986; Chang, 1999). This result is similar to other empirical studies such as Friend
and Lang (1988), Titman andWessels (1988), Khemiri andNoubbigh (2018), Li and Islam (2019),
and Ramli et al. (2019). This also supports Hypothesis 1 presented in Section 3, which suggests
that profitability has a significant impact on the capital structure of firms in Malaysia.
Regarding growth opportunities, they are measured by three indicators: growth in total
assets, growth in tangible assets and growth in intangible assets (Tobin’sQ). The coefficient
related to the variable growth of total assets (growth of tangible assets) is positive (negative)
and is statistically significant with the book and market value of total and long-term debt,
while they have an insignificant effect on short-term debt. This result confirms the approach
of trade-off theory, that the higher a firm’s growthmeans greater financial distress costs. The
coefficients of growth opportunity measured by Tobin’s Q is negative and significant at the
level of 1% in all regressions for both book and market value of total, long-term and short-
term debt. Higher market value firms tend to use less debt to finance their investment. This
finding confirms the fact that higher-growth Malaysian firms are able to take advantage of
new equity issue in stockmarkets. These findings are in line with the argument of Berens and
Cuny (1995) that growth opportunity implies high equity financing and less leverage.
Further, our findings are consistent with agency theory because high-growth Malaysian
firms are likely to finance new projects with bank loans. These are also consistent with trade-
off theory, that high-growth firms should use less debt because growth opportunity is in
intangible assets without collateral value if firms face bankruptcy (Myers, 1984). However,
this is not in line with the pecking order theory, that firms with strong growth opportunities
have access to external financing to meet their capital investment requirements. In addition,
our results are consistent with many previous studies, including Lemmon et al. (2008),
Gormley andMatsa (2013), Matemilola et al. (2018), Harris and Roark (2019), and Li and Islam
(2019), but do not support the findings of Kester (1986), Vo (2017), Khemiri and Noubbigh
(2018), and Paredes Gomez et al. (2016). This can be explained by the fact that with the stock
market gradually evolving over recent decades, most corporate finance in Malaysia is not
bank credit. In this case, Hypothesis 2 is verified, arguing that the effect of growth
opportunity on capital structure is highly significant.
The coefficient for collaterals (tangible assets) is positive and significant in regression
explaining total debt and long-term debt but insignificant in regression explaining short-term
debt. These results indicate that firms can borrow more long-term debt if they have more
tangible assets for collateral. The positive relationship between debt and collateral (tangible
assets) is consistent with both trade-off and pecking order theories because tangible assets
serve as collateral and firmswithmore tangible assets usemore debt (Frank andGoyal, 2009).
Moreover, the risk of lending to firms with more tangible assets is lower; therefore, the debt
ratios increase. This result is also consistent with the agency theory of capital structure
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), as firms may shift to riskier investments and
transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders, while tangible assets help to reduce the
agency costs of debts. The results are also consistent with Li and Islam (2019), Matemilola
et al. (2018), Vo (2017), Flannery and Hankins (2013), and Frank and Goyal (2009) who find
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that tangible assets are positively related to debt. Our result also indicates that Malaysian
firms tend to be obligated to put forward collateral for long-term borrowing. More
importantly, given the stability of the debt structure, firms with higher tangible assets use
fewer short-term debts for a more flexible finance structure. Overall, our evidence supports
Hypothesis 3 and suggests that firms with more asset tangibility use more debt because of
having high collateral to support higher debt levels.
Looking at the effect of taxation on debt, measured by the three different indicators,
corporate tax, non-debt tax shields, and tax shields, contrary to our expectations we find that
the corporate tax has an insignificant effect on all measures of capital structure in Malaysia.
Thus we have to reject our hypothesis (Hypothesis 4) that capital structure is related
positively to corporate tax. This result is not in line with the argument of Khemiri and
Noubbigh (2018), which listed firms tend to benefit from a tax reduction. It is also inconsistent
with the trade-off theory which argues that the higher the corporate tax, the more debt the
firms use in order to benefit from the tax. On the other hand, we find that tax-shield, measured
by total taxes to EBIT, has a negative and significant impact on allmeasures of both book and
market value of total, long-term and short-term debt at the level of 1%. This result is in line
with our expectations, indicating that Hypothesis 5 is supported, that total debt, long-term
debt, and short-term debt are associated negatively with tax shield. This significant negative
relationship is in contradiction to the benefits of tax shields first introduced by Modigliani
and Miller (1963) and the conclusions of other studies (Moradi and Paulet, 2019; De Angelo
andMasulis, 1980; Walsh and Ryan, 1997). Moradi and Paulet (2019) argue that there are two
probable explanations for such a finding. First, the cost of issuing debt outweighs the
corresponding benefits because either the expected bankruptcy cost is high or no taxable
capacity is left for firms to enjoy the tax deductibility of debt financing. Second, even though
firms decide to issue debt, the scarcity of lenders such as banks in the markets impedes them
in doing this. This interpretation is in line with our results regarding non-debt tax shields,
because firms are obliged to embrace other choices to reduce the level of taxable income.
In regard to the non-debt tax shield, it is positively associated with the book and market
value of total, long-term and short-term debt. These results are not in line with our
expectation that non-debt tax shields have a negative and significant impact on the capital
structure. Thus, Hypothesis 6 is rejected. These findings are also not in line with the trade-off
theory which argues that firms with large amounts of non-debt-tax shields must limit their
access to external financing. The results are inconsistent with De-Angelo andMasulis (1980),
Matemilola et al. (2018), and Ramli et al. (2019), who argue that firms can use depreciation to
shelter their income. De-Angelo and Masulis (1980) also argue that non-debt tax shields are
substitutes for tax shields. It is also inconsistent with €Oztekin and Flannery (2012) and Guney
et al. (2011), who find a negative relationship between a non-debt tax shield and debt.
However, this result agrees with Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018), who report a positive and
significant relationship between non-debt tax and leverage at the 1% level. They argue that
firms must resort to debt because they do not have sufficient non-debt-tax shields to
substitute corporate tax. Specifically, depreciation and amortization expenses, due to the
small capital investment, do not generate significant cash flows.
For liquidity, the two-step system GMM shows that the coefficients of liquidity are
negative and significant in all regressions at the 1% level. This indicates that higher liquidity
of Malaysian firms leads to a decrease in the debt. This may be due to the firms’ inability to
pay their short-term obligations, forcing them to find other sources of financing. This result is
in line with agency theory, which suggests that when the agency costs of liquidity are high,
outside creditors tend to reduce the debt financing limit available (Myers andRajan 1998). It is
also consistent with pecking order theory and empirical studies (Vo, 2017; Khemiri and
Noubbigh, 2018). Hence, overall, Hypothesis 7 is confirmed, arguing that the capital structure




Similarly, we find that the effect of earning volatility on all measures of both book and
market value of debt is positive and significant at the level of 1% or 5%, indicating that the
higher the volatility of profit, the higher the debt. This may be due to the fact that Malaysian
firms do not use prudent debt to protect against financial distress and the risk of bankruptcy.
They are not, consequently, able to pay interest and debt securities at maturity. This result is
not in line with the trade-off and pecking order theories which argue that firms use lower debt
as earnings volatility increases in order to avoid financial distress or bankruptcy (Akhtar,
2012). The result also contravenes some earlier studies such as Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018),
Matemilola et al. (2018), Rajagopal (2011), Lemmon et al. (2008), Chen (2004), and Friend and
Lang (1988), who find that earnings volatility is negatively related to debt. However, it is
consistent with the agency cost of debt, which states that risky firms borrow more, and is
supported by studies presented by Moradi and Paulet (2019), Fama and French (2002), and
Kim and Sorensen (1986). Overall, our evidence supports Hypothesis 8 that argues that firms
with higher volatility in returns have less debt.
The coefficient on cash flow volatility has a negative and statistically significant impact
on both book andmarket value of total, long-term and short-term debt at the level of 1%. This
is consistent with Hypothesis 9 and indicates that firmswithmore volatile cash flows use less
debt. These results suggest that an increase in cash flow volatility is linked to a firm
decreasing its borrowing. In other words, firms with higher levels of operating cash flow do
not need to issue debt in response to volatile cash flow, indicating current operating cash-flow
levels may be sufficient to satisfy funding needs. These results are inconsistent with Frank
and Goyal (2009), Bates et al. (2009), and Harris and Roark (2019), who find that firms utilize
additional debt as a response to cash flow volatility. This result is also not in line with Dessı
and Robertson (2003), who find that firmswithmore volatile cash flow are likely to havemore
debt in their capital structure. However, our results are consistent with Memon et al. (2018)
and Keefe and Yaghoubi (2016), who find that high cash flow of volatile firms tends to reduce
debt but continues the use of non-financial liabilities. Our results do support the pecking
order theory, that firms with more available funds use fewer external sources of financing
than other comparable firms (Mateev et al., 2013).
Turning to the control variables, we observe interesting results in their impact on the capital
structure of firms. The coefficients of firm size are positive and significant in regression of total,
long-term and short-term debt. These results suggest that larger firms tend to use more debt to
finance their investments compared to smaller firms. The results are consistent with agency
and trade-off theories that bigger firms are more stable and less likely to go bankrupt (Frank
and Goyal, 2009). Similar results are found by Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018), Matemilola et al.
(2018), Vo (2017), Oino and Ukaegbu (2015), Flannery and Hankins (2013), andMatemilola et al.
(2013). However, the finding is inconsistent with the results of Moradi and Paulet (2019) and
Chakraborty (2010), who find that firm size is negatively associated with debt measures,
supporting the pecking order theory. Firm age has a negative and significant effect on debt
measures, suggesting that older firms have less debt than their younger counterparts. This
result is also inconsistent with the findings of Khemiri andNoubbigh (2018) who find a positive
relationship between firm age and debt ratios. These authors conclude that the longer listing of
firms on the stockmarket ensures better supervision, thus reducing agency costs in the event of
the use of debt. Our results are not consistent with trade-off theory, but support pecking order
theory (Khemiri and Noubbigh, 2018).
For country variables, economic growth measured by the GDP growth rate has no
significant effect on debt measures. This indicates that economic growth is not closely linked
to debt usage. Similarly, the relationship between the degree of financial development
measured by market capitalization and debt ratios is insignificant. This result is inconsistent
with Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018), who argue that the development of stock markets is a
viable choice for corporate financing. However, the effect of inflation rates and lending
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interest rates on both book and market values of debt is positive and significant. These
results are in line with the findings of Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018), who argue that this can
be attributed to the real value of tax deductions (tax saving) that will be high during
inflationary periods. In addition, they argue that the positive relationship between the
nominal interest rate and the debt emerges when inflation is expected to increase.
5.2 Firm’s age and capital structure: study of the relationship according to quadratic
methods
The use of the variable age is commonly suggested in the literature (Diamond, 1989; Petersen
and Rajan 1994) and applied in empirical analysis (Brewer et al., 1996; Hall et al., 2004; Hyytinen
andPajarinen, 2008; LaRocca et al., 2011) to investigate corporate financial decisions during the
firm’s life cycle. Whereas this variable offers data points for prospective lenders, reducing the
information asymmetry problem, it could be a rough proxy for reputation. Indeed, each firm
could also build or harm its reputation over time (it is possible in the upcoming years that the
firm loses its reputation rather than building it up). Diamond (1989) considers reputation to
mean the goodname a firmhas built up over the years. Petersen andRajan (1994) find that older
firms, which ought to be of higher quality, have higher debt ratios.
In addition, our data shows that the market-value debt ratio is slightly at the highest level
for firms in the second quartile, but lowest for firms in the fourth quartile of the age range.
This suggests that the relationship between age and the debt ratio isU-shaped. However, the
book-value debt ratio seems to progressively decrease as firms move from the first to the last
quartile age limit. Berger and Udell (1998) confirm that changes in capital structure can be a
non-linear function of a firm’s age, as considered by Brewer et al. (1996). Pfaffermayr et al.
(2013) also confirm that the estimate for the quadratic age term is much higher than in the
baseline regression. This, in turn, suggests that the non-linear relationship between firm age
and debt is needed. For these reasons, we should include a quadratic term for firm age in our
regressions to test for the possibility of a non-linear age impact on capital structure.
To push the analysis further and highlight the issue of non-linearity, it is usual to resort to
the quadratic regression method to test the non-monotonic relationship between firm’s age
and capital structure. In other words, the inclusion of a quadratic functional form for the
age-leverage relationship is in line with Pfaffermayr et al. (2013), Huynh and Petrunia (2010)
and La Rocca et al. (2011). As a decision criterion, β1 and β2 are compared (as expected, β1 < 0
and β2 > 0), and a conclusion reached for a non-monotonic effect of age on capital structure if
the two coefficients yield opposite signs.
From this point of view and similar to the above analyses, to account for non-linearity in
the model, we included the squared term of the variable age (named AGE2) and we use two
econometric methods. First, it is a question of examining this relationship using an estimate
of panel data methods (pooled OLS, RE, FE, GLS, and PCSE). Eq. (1) is thus rewritten as
follows:
CapStructureit ¼ β0 þ β1PROFITit þ β2GRWTA1it þ β3GRWTNA2it þ β4GRWTQ3it
þβ5COLLAit þ β6CORTAXit þ β7TAXSHIELit þ β8NONTAXit
þβ9LIQUIDit þ β10EARNVOLit þ β11CASHVOLit þ β12SIZEit












Second, to examine the non-monotonic relationship between age and capital structure using a
quadratic regression method, as discussed above, it is customary to resort to System-GMM
estimations for dynamic panel-data models. On this basis, Eq. (1) is rewritten as follows:
CapStructureit ¼ β0 þ β1CapStructureit−1 þ β2PROFITit þ β3GRWTA1it
þβ4GRWTNA2it þ β5GRWTQ3it þ β6COLLAit þ β7CORTAXit
þβ8TAXSHIELit þ β9NONTAXit þ β10LIQUIDit þ β11EARNVOLit
þβ12CASHVOLit þ β13SIZEit þ β14AGEit þ β15AGE2it þ β16GDPit









As reported in Table 11, all columns show that the coefficient associated with the
previous variable AGE has a positive and statistically significant sign at 1% [1]. This
result attests the predictions of the trade-off theory. As for the coefficient associated with
the square-previous variable AGE2, it has a negative and statistically significant sign at
the 1% level. This indicates a non-linear relationship between age and capital structure.
In other words, this confirms that the effect of firm age on capital structure (debt
financing) is non-linear.
In all models, the impact of age on capital structure measures is non-monotonic since
estimates on the linear and quadratic terms have the opposite sign. The coefficient on the
linear term is always positive, indicating that debt financing should increase with age in the
early years of a firm’s life, while the negative coefficient on the quadratic term suggests that
debt financing eventually levels off and decreases with age. This may due to the fact that
listed firms in Malaysia may use debt as a critical financial resource to sustain their business
in the start-up and growing stages, but gradually reduce their reliance on debts in the
consolidation period. Pfaffermayr et al. (2013), Huynh and Petrunia (2010) and La Rocca et al.
(2011) also find that the relationship between age and debt financing is non-monotonic.
Finally, Table 11 also shows that the results of all other variables are similar to the main
results reported in Tables 5–10.
6. Conclusion
Analysis of financing decision in emerging economies remains an interesting topic in its own
right. Although there are many studies concerning capital structure determinants, there is
still a gap in examining this issue in emerging economies. Thus, this paper examines the
capital structure determinants of 827 non-financial firms listed on the stock market of
Malaysia over the period 2008 to 2017 (8,270 yearly observations). It uses the book and
market value of total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt as measures of capital
structure. In terms of methodology, it designs the model using static panel estimation
techniques as well as difference and system dynamic GMM estimators. The empirical
analysis suggests that the coefficients of debt-measure persistence are positively significant.
We find that profitability, growth opportunity, tax-shield, liquidity and cash flow volatility
have a negative and significant impact on debt measures. However, the effect of collateral,
non-debt tax, and earnings volatility on measures of debt is positive and significant. In





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































leverage. In general, our results support the propositions advocated by both pecking order
and trade-off theories. Finally, a non-monotonic U-shaped relationship exists between firm
growth and firm age.
The empirical analysis of this study has several policy implications for regulatory and
supervisory authorities as well as for managers and shareholders. First, since the capital
structure of firms is influenced by company and country characteristics, it is important for
management to know the ‘method’ and ‘how’ its valuewill increase (decrease) according to the
company and country characteristics and the appropriate capital structure decision. Second,
firms in emerging countries still rely on internally generated funds to support their
investment activities and growth, and find it very difficult to obtain external financing. Thus,
governments in these economies should pay increased attention with a strong emphasis on
policy actions that will remove unnecessary administrative burdens for firms and will
facilitate their access to external (bank) financing. Third, firmswith higher levels of operating
cash flows do not need to issue debt in response to volatile cash flows and returns, indicating
that current operating cash-flow levels may be sufficient to satisfy funding needs. Fourth,
firm directors must maximize the benefits of the tax shield in the interest of debt, which can
increase the company’s value. In other words, capital structure decisions that balance the
benefits and costs of debt financing and add value to the company are very much needed.
Fifth, creditors such as financial institutions and fund managers are obliged to make timely
payments to fulfil their financial commitments; therefore, the creditors face a dilemma: to
invest or not to invest. Firm managers should be aware of this dilemma and try to attract
investors’ trust based on the firm-specific features of corresponding companies. Sixth, the
manager of a company must fully understand the preferences of sceptical investors and
respond accurately to the conservative behaviour of credit owners. Seventh, a thorough
understanding of the relationship between capital structure and firm value is clearly
beneficial for different stock market participants. Further, both firm managers and equity
investors are clearly interested in value creation through capital structure decisions. Finally,
as suggested by Khemiri and Noubbigh (2018), business managers in these economies are
advised to take into account the stability of the macroeconomic environment and the role of
monetary and fiscal policies put in place by the authorities. This would allow the company to
opt for an adequate financing policy requiring the balancing of benefits and the costs of debt.
Further research may consider additional country-specific variables that determine a
firm’s capital structure. The analysis could be enriched by considering a broader time period
in order to elucidate whether companies’ capital structure changes during different economic
cycles. It may be useful to include specific information on corporate governance in such
studies.
Note
1. Results using panel datamethods (pooled OLS, RE, FE, GLS and PCSE) are similar to those for GMM
but we do not report the results, to save space. The results are, however, available from the authors
upon request. Thanks to the anonymous referee for these suggestions.
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